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HAMMOND v. NORTON: TAKING ACTION TO PRESERVE
THE NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1969, Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) to deal with the profound impact of the human pres-
ence on the natural environment.' Rapidly expanding population
growth, mass urbanization and industrialization, as well as great de-
pletions of the country's natural resources were but a few of the
problems NEPA sought to address.2 Recognizing that human ac-
tions affecting the environment needed to be heavily regulated,
Congress mandated certain requirements so that man and nature
could co-exist and safeguard the future for both.3 To that end,
NEPA, which created the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ), required environmental impact statements (EIS) to be sub-
mitted prior to government approval for all acts that may affect the
environment. 4
The primary purpose of an EIS is to ensure that environmental
concerns are adequately addressed prior to the implementation of
any project that will either enhance or adversely affect the human
environment 5 An EIS must fully discuss all significant environmen-
tal impacts of a proposed project.6 The EIS requirement enables
both the public and agency decision-makers to make fully informed
judgments based on the anticipated impacts of a project and all
reasonable alternatives. 7 An EIS should be fully developed, yet
brief, and supported by relevant evidence. 8 An EIS is not simply a
formality required by the federal government; rather, it is an impor-
1. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (a) (2000) (noting congressional declaration of NEPA).
2. See id. (illustrating need for environmental regulation).
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (explaining responsibilities of federal government in
administering NEPA).
4. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (declaring NEPA's purpose, outlining require-
ments of Act and establishing CEQ). The CEQ functions as an aid to the Environ-
mental Protection Agency. See id. § 4321. It is an executive agency designed to
coordinate and advise on all federal environmental programs. See id.
5. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 1502.1 (2005) (noting primary purpose of EIS).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (explaining requirement that all alternatives be
disclosed).
7. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 1502.1 (discussing purpose for disclosing all alternatives).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (discussing EIS length and substance requirements).
(459)
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tant factor in determining the strength of a proposed action in light
of its environmental effects.9
Agencies must issue an EIS when parties seek to obtain right-
of-way permits over public lands. 10 The appropriate agency must
then go through several stages of drafting and issue an EIS describ-
ing the positive and negative consequences of approving the pro-
ject." Among other requirements, the agency is obligated to
discuss possible options to the project in order to compare and con-
trast the benefits and detriments. 12 Not only does the agency have
to examine all reasonable options, but it must also include a "no
action alternative," discussing the totality of consequences if the
project did not proceed.' 3
The Mineral Leasing Act' 4 requires any company seeking to
construct, operate or maintain a pipeline on federal lands to obtain
a right-of-way from the Bureau of Land Management (BLM).1 5 The
BLM, a subdivision of the Department of the Interior (DOI), is the
agency primarily responsible for reviewing applications for rights-
of-way across federal property. 16 In Hammond v. Norton (Ham-
mond), 17 the District Court for the District of Columbia addressed
whether the BLM fully developed the EIS no action alternative for a
right-of-way application by a petroleum products company.18
The BLM submitted a final draft of the EIS that discussed rea-
sonable alternatives to the proposed project, including a no action
alternative. 19 Hammond, the plaintiff, brought suit alleging,
among other charges, that the BLM had not complied with the no
action alternative requirement because the BLM's treatment of the
no action alternative was not fully developed and was given only
9. See id. (explaining role of EIS in approval or denial of proposed actions).
10. See generally United States Environmental Protection Agency: EA and EIS
Components, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/basics/nepa.html#eis (last visited
Mar. 9, 2006) (describing basic information related to National Environmental
Policy Act).
11. See id. (outlining National Environmental Policy Act components).
12. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 1502.14 (discussing requirements for alternatives section
of EIS in order to provide basis for comparison among possible alternatives and
proposed action).
13. See id. (discussing requirement of "no action alternative" in addition to
other feasible alternative actions).
14. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-96 (2000) (establishing qualifications for mineral
lessees).
15. See Hammond v. Norton, 370 F. Supp. 2d 226, 233 (D.D.C. 2005) (noting
requirements of Mineral Leasing Act).
16. See id. at 233 n.2 (discussing establishment and role of BLM).
17. 370 F. Supp. 2d 226 (D.D.C. 2005).
18. See id. at 232 (noting issue before court).
19. See id. (noting BLM's procedural steps).
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cursory examination.20 The district court found the BLM fulfilled
its obligation to examine reasonable alternatives and dismissed all
counts alleging otherwise.21
This Note will discuss the district court's decision in Hammond
v. Norton.22 Section II discusses the facts and procedural history of
Hammond.23 Section III explains relevant case law, statutory author-
ity and other pertinent background information. 24 Section IV dis-
cusses the Hammond court's statutory interpretation and its analysis
20. See id. at 232-38 (discussing charges brought against defendant). In count
one, Hammond alleged the BLM violated NEPA by not jointly considering Wil-
liams's and Equilon's projects as a single action. See id. at 243-44. The court found
for Hammond on this charge, finding the BLM improperly considered the two
projects separately in the EISs because the projects had cumulative effects. See id.
at 244. In count two, Hammond alleged the BLM's final EIS failed to consider the
purpose and need for the proposed action, which the court found meritless. See id.
at 240-41. In count five, Hammond alleged the final EIS failed to consider all
adverse environmental effects, but the District Court found the claim lacked merit.
See id. at 242. In count six, Hammond alleged the final EIS failed to consider the
socioeconomic impact of pipeline construction. See id. at 242-43. The court found
this charge erroneous because socioeconomic effects did not result from the pro-
ject's environmental impact and were, therefore, outside the scope of NEPA and
the BLM. See id. In count seven, Hammond alleged the BLM and the DOI failed
to comply with NEPA by failing to evaluate the Williams pipeline in good faith. See
id. at 265-66. The court found Hammond offered no proof of this claim. See id. In
count eight, Hammond alleged the DOI acted arbitrarily and capriciously in rely-
ing on the BLM's flawed EIS. See id. at 239 n.9. The court did not address this
allegation because its substance was raised in other counts. See id. In counts nine
and ten of the amended complaint, Hammond alleged it was improper for the
BLM and the DOI to allow the project because it adversely affected public and
private interests, as well as, public health and safety. See id. at 259. The court
found the claims to be irrelevant, as they were not raised in Hammond's brief. See
id. In count eleven, Hammond alleged that FWS acted arbitrarily and capriciously
by issuing a defective biological opinion pursuant to the Endangered Species Act.
See id. at 264-65. The court found the opinion sufficient. See id. In count twelve,
Hammond alleged the BLM was required to prepare a supplemental EIS in re-
sponse to newly emerging facts. See id. at 254-55. The court determined a supple-
mental EIS was unnecessary because the additional information referred to by
Hammond became known after the BLM submitted the final EIS. See id. In count
thirteen, Hammond alleged that Williams was financially unable to complete the
proposed project; therefore, a supplemental EIS was needed to determine the con-
sequences of proceeding if Williams could not complete the project. See id. at 256-
57. The court found Williams's financial situation irrelevant under NEPA and the
CEQ. See id. In counts fourteen, fifteen and sixteen, Hammond alleged the Forest
Plan for the Manti-La Sal National Forest was incorrectly amended, but the court
found the amendment sufficient. See id. at 259-63.
21. See id. at 267 (holding BLM's discussion of alternatives, including no ac-
tion alternative, sufficient to withstand review).
22. For a discussion of all charges brought in Hammond see supra note 20.
23. For a discussion of the facts and procedural history of Hammond, see infra
notes 28-62 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of NEPA, CEQ and pertinent case law see infra notes 63-
116 and accompanying text.
20061
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of relevant case law in making its decision. 25 Section V analyzes
whether the District of Columbia's determination was proper. 26 Fi-
nally, Section VI evaluates the impact the Hammond holding may
have on future judicial review regarding compliance with the no
action alternative requirement.27
II. FACTS
In Hammond, the Williams Pipe Line Company (Williams), a
petroleum products company, sought to develop and construct a
refined petroleum products pipeline from Salt Lake City, Utah to
Bloomfield, New Mexico. 28 Williams applied for a right-of-way per-
mit through the Manti-La Sal and Uinta National Forests in order
to construct the pipeline. 29 The pipeline, which would be approxi-
mately 480 miles long, with 260 newly constructed miles, would
largely run over private lands. 30 Approximately ninety-seven miles
of pipeline would run over federal lands, including the Manti-La
Sal and Uinta National Forests.31 Williams sought construction of
the pipeline to provide access to the Salt Lake City region, an area
that Williams claimed had inadequate means of obtaining petro-
leum products because of its isolation from the national petroleum
products grid. 32 Williams asserted that Utah's dependence on
scarce local oil supplies, coupled with the state's inability to access
the national market, created a lack of competition among suppli-
ers. 33 This lack of competition led to significantly higher prices for
petroleum products in Utah compared with the rest of the
country.
3 4
Various environmental protection groups, individual landown-
ers and another petroleum products company, Sinclair Oil (collec-
tively Hammond), brought a sixteen count lawsuit against the
25. For a narrative analysis of the Hammond decision, see infra notes 117-30
and accompanying text.
26. For a critical analysis of the Hammond decision, see infra notes 131-56 and
accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of the impact of the Hammond decision on future en-
forcement of EIS requirements, see infra notes 157-64 and accompanying text.
28. See Hammond, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 232-33 (discussing Williams' proposed
pipeline project).
29. See id. (examining pertinent parts of Williams's right-of-way application).
30. See id. at 231, 233 (outlining proposed route of Williams's pipeline).
31. See id. at 233 (discussing amount of pipeline proposed to run over na-
tional forests).
32. See id. at 232-33 (discussing Williams's motivation for proposed project).
33. See Hammond, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 232-33 (explaining economic and geo-
graphical barriers responsible for Utah's above average petroleum product prices).
34. See id. (explaining Utah's highly priced petroleum products).
4
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Secretary of the Interior and the BLM (collectively Norton). 35
Hammond asserted claims under NEPA, the CEQ and other acts. 3 6
Hammond sought to enjoin any further action regarding the devel-
opment and construction of the refined petroleum products pipe-
line project.37
In February of 1999, Williams and another petroleum com-
pany, Equilon, formed a joint venture, creating a third company,
Aspen.38 Under the Aspen banner, Equilon filed for a right-of-way
to construct a petroleum products pipeline running from Bloom-
field, New Mexico to Odessa, Texas. 39 The Williams and Equilon
pipelines were intended to meet at Bloomfield, forming one contin-
uous pipeline from Utah to Texas. 40 Also acting under the newly
formed Aspen company, Williams amended its right-of-way applica-
tion in 1999, naming Aspen as the applicant.41 Once complete, the
full pipeline would connect Salt Lake City to western Texas and,
more importantly, to the national petroleum products grid.42 The
pipeline would provide shipping and refinery capabilities not other-
wise readily available in Utah. 43
Over Aspen's objections, the BLM notified Aspen that it in-
tended to create an EIS for purposes of NEPA review. 44 The EIS
would reflect the environmental impact of the total project running
from Utah to Texas, rather than two separate statements, one for
each half of the total pipeline project.45 Construction could not
commence, however, until the BLM approved the total project be-
cause both projects were considered a single enterprise. 46 As a re-
35. See id. (noting various plaintiffs).
36. See id. at 232 n.1 (naming plaintiffs). The plaintiffs were Forest Guardi-
ans, Living Rivers, the Utah Environmental Congress, Citizens for Safe Pipelines,
and Sinclair Oil, a petroleum products company with current presence in Salt
Lake City, but based out of Wyoming. See id.
37. See id. at 237 (discussing Hammond's desired remedy).
38. See Hammond, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 233 (outliningjoint venture by Williams
and Equilon to create continuous pipeline from Utah to Texas).
39. See id. at 233-34 (discussing Equilon's application for right-of-way as part
of agreement with Williams under their joint venture, Aspen).
40. See id. (highlighting goal of Williams's and Equilon's joint venture to
build one continuous pipeline).
41. See id. at 233 (explaining Williams's right-of-way application amendment).
42. See id. at 232 (explaining pipeline project).
43. See Hammond, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 232 (mentioning benefits deriving from
completion of Aspen pipeline project).
44. See id. at 234 (explaining BLM's notification procedure).
45. See id. (discussing how both Aspen pipeline projects would be considered
in single EIS due to cumulative effects).
46. See id. (explaining logistical difficulties arising from BLM decision to con-
sider pipeline projects together).
2006]
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suit of the BLM's decision, Williams and Equilon dissolved Aspen in
March of 2000, and the two separate companies proceeded inde-
pendently to build their respective halves of the pipeline.47
Williams then filed another amended right-of-way application
with the BLM. 48 The amendment stated that the Williams portion
of the pipeline would end at Bloomfield, New Mexico, and Williams
would no longer include Equilon's Texas to New Mexico pipeline
as an alternative supply source for its own pipeline, a factor used in
determining the separateness of the two projects. 49 Williams's
amended application requested a review independent from any
project applied for by Equilon. 50 Equilon also filed an amended
right-of-way application for its Texas to New Mexico pipeline
project.5 1
In February of 2001, the BLM completed a draft of its EIS for
the Williams project, independent of the Equilon project.52 The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other organizations
protested segmenting the report.53 They claimed the EIS failed to
consider the impact of the total project which had essentially been
changed only in name following Aspen's dissolution.54 The BLM
released the EIS report over those objections, defending its deci-
sion to analyze the projects separately.55 Hammond asserted that
the BLM did not adequately discuss the no action alternative by
failing to "rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable
47. See id. (clarifying Williams's and Equilon's decision to forgo joint venture
due to BLM's decision to consider projects in one EIS).
48. See Hammond, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 233-34 (discussing Williams's subsequent
application following Aspen dissolution).
49. See id. at 234 (noting changes made to Williams's amended application).
50. See id. (mentioning Williams's efforts to sever ties with Equilon's proposed
project).
51. See id. (explaining Equilon's amended right-of-way application made in
effort to be considered separately from Williams's pipeline project in ensuing EIS).
52. See id. at 235 (noting BLM's completion of separate EIS for Williams's
project).
53. See Hammond, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 235 (noting EPA's objection to segment-
ing EIS).
54. See id. (discussing EPA's objection to BLM's decision to create separate
assessments for Equilon's and Williams's projects).
55. See id. (discussing BLM's defense of decision). The BLM defended itself,
claiming the Williams project would not automatically trigger other actions requir-
ing an EIS, could operate independently of the Equilon pipeline, and was not an
interdependent part of any other project. See id. at 235. The BLM also noted the
areas of geographic overlap which would cause an increased environmental impact
are minimal. See id.
6
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alternatives" pursuant to NEPA requirements. 56 After several addi-
tional approval stages, the BLM ultimately accepted the project
proposal. 57
On October 12, 2001, the DOI issued a Record of Decision
granting Williams's application for a right-of-way permit.58 On No-
vember 9, 2001, Hammond filed suit against the DOI, the BLM and
their respective officials. 59 Hammond requested that the district
court enjoin the Williams pipeline from proceeding as scheduled,
pending a reworked EIS and Record of Decision. 60 The court later
granted various motions for outside parties to intervene, including
Williams, on behalf of the defendants. 61 As part of the district
court's holding, it found the BLM's treatment of the no action al-
ternative sufficiently complied with NEPA. 62
III. BACKGROUND
Prior to approving projects and proposals, NEPA requires all
federal agencies to consider the environmental impacts of pro-
posed actions, as well as reasonable alternatives to those actions. 63
In order to comply with NEPA, agencies prepare EISs to discuss
fully the proposed actions in light of the actions' potential environ-
mental impacts.64 NEPA charged the CEQ with monitoring agen-
cies' compliance under the Act. 65
Congress instituted the CEQ as an executive agency under
NEPA. 66 The CEQ monitors NEPA compliance among federal agen-
56. See id. at 241 (discussing Hammond's allegation that BLM did not comply
with NEPA requirements); 40 C.F.R. pts. 1502.13, 1502.14 (noting requirements of
reasonable alternatives section of EIS).
57. See Hammond, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 236 (discussing requirement of Fish and
Wildlife Service and United States Forest Service approval prior to final approval of
project).
58. See id. at 237 (noting DOI's approval of right-of-way application).
59. See id. (filing complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief based on
claims under NEPA, APA, Mineral Leasing Act, Endangered Species Act and For-
est Management Act).
60. See id. (noting Hammond's request for relief).
61. See id. (noting court's grant for Williams to intervene as defendant and
Carol Parker and Citizens for Safe Pipelines, Inc. to intervene as plaintiffs).
62. See Hammond, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 242 (holding BLM's no action alternative
was sufficient to comply with NEPA).
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (discussing purpose and requirements of NEPA).
64. See id. (explaining NEPA's EIS preparation requirement).
65. See id. (discussing mission of CEQ under NEPA).
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (establishing CEQ pursuant to NEPA). See also The
White House Council on Environmental Quality, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
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cies, including the amount of detail required for environmental as-
sessments. 67 It manages federal environmental efforts and works
with federal agencies to develop environmental policies and
initiatives.68
The CEQ defines the requirements of an EIS:
[An EIS] shall provide full and fair discussion of signifi-
cant environmental impacts and shall inform deci-
sionmakers and the public of the reasonable alternatives
which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or en-
hance the quality of the human environment .... State-
ments shall be concise, clear, and to the point, and shall
be supported by evidence that the agency has made the
necessary environmental analyses. 69
The CEQ also requires that an EIS contain a statement that "pre-
sent[s] the environmental impacts of the proposal and the alterna-
tives in comparative form, thus sharply defining the issues and
providing a clear basis for choice among options by the deci-
sionmaker and the public." 70 This section, the heart of the EIS,
must include information that thoroughly explores and objectively
assesses all reasonable alternatives.71 The section must illustrate
each option thoroughly, including the alternative of no action, in
order to allow reviewers to compare the alternatives on their com-
parative merits.72
No action alternatives are further discussed through the CEQ
procedures, which establish NEPA to implement the CEQ require-
ments. 73 The inclusion of a no action alternative is designed to aid
the reader in comparing the beneficial and adverse impacts of no
action against the various other plans proposed by the applicant
and the agency.74 "A description of the environmental setting shall
be included in the 'no action alternative' for the purpose of provid-
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (explaining role of CEQ as NEPA enforcer). See also
NEPA Task Force, Council on Environmental Quality, http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/ntf/
(last visited Mar. 9, 2006) (discussing creation of NEPA task force).
68. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (describing role of CEQ).
69. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 1502.1 (outlining EIS purposes).
70. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 1502.14 (discussing EIS requirement for alternative plans
to be illustrated for purposes of comparison with proposed action).
71. See id. (noting purpose of expounding alternatives to proposed action).
72. See id. (outlining requirements for alternative action section of EIS, with
emphasis on alternative of no action).
73. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 6.203 (2005) (discussing additional criteria for evaluating
sufficient no action alternative).
74. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 6.203(c) (discussing benefit of having no action alterna-
tive for basis of comparison with proposed action and other alternative actions).
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ing needed background information. '75 The level of detail regard-
ing the affected environment must be proportionate with the
complexity and importance of the relevant issues.76
Furthermore, the CEQ, in conjunction with the EPA, provides
some guidance as to what the no action alternative discussion
should entail. 77 A no action alternative is a discussion of all antici-
pated outcomes and their ensuing environmental and financial im-
plications if the proposed project does not occur. 78 It then
compares the no action alternative to all other alternatives by
weighing all necessary and reasonable predictions of the no action
alternative. 79 For example, if a project to build a railroad is denied,
a road may be built in its place and would be considered the result
of taking no action.80
The "rule of reason" governs which alternatives must be dis-
cussed in an EIS and to what extent.81 NEPA requires the agency to
weigh all reasonable alternatives and come to a fully informed deci-
sion.8 2 Agency decisions are reviewed under the arbitrary and ca-
pricious standard of judicial review, pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).83 The following cases are illustrative of the
wide body of case law dealing with the requirements of a no action
alternative pursuant to NEPA.84
In Westlands Water District v. United States Department of Interior
(Westlands) ,85 California municipal water agencies and power dis-
tricts brought an action against the DOI before the Ninth Circuit,
challenging the administration of a federal water project that would
redirect water away from municipal canals and dams.8 6 The plain-
75. See id. (explaining requirements for no action alternative section of EIS).
76. See id. (discussing need for well-developed no action alternative section).
77. See 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500-08 (defining criteria for no action alternative).
78. See Hammond v. Norton, 370 F. Supp. 2d 226, 241 (D.D.C. 2005) (discussing
requirements for no action alternative).
79. See id. (discussing process of examining no action alternative).
80. See id. (analyzing method of interpreting purpose of no action alterna-
tive); 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500-08 (establishing rules and regulations for CEQ).
81. See City of Grapevine v. Dep't of Transp., 17 F.3d 1502, 1506 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (citing Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 195 (D.C.
Cir. 1991)) (petitioning FAA to halt airport expansion plan).
82. See Davis v. Latschar, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (seeking to
enjoin National Park Service program from conducting controlled harvest of deer
at national military park and national historical site).
83. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (a) (2000) (establishing standards of review for agen-
cies subject to APA).
84. For a discussion of case law and statutory authority discussing the no ac-
tion alternative, see infra notes 85-116 and accompanying text.
85. 376 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2004).
86. See id. at 860-61 (noting charges brought in case).
2006] 467
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tiffs claimed the DOI failed to comply with NEPA and the CEQ's
EIS requirements. 8 7 The court analyzed the effectiveness of the
DOI's EIS and held the standard for a court's NEPA analysis is
whether an EIS's discussion of possible project alternatives allows
the reader to make an informed decision. 88
In Westlands, the EIS examined possible effects on the sus-
tainability of local fish populations and preservation of water quality
standards.8 9 The no action alternative discussion illustrated how in-
action would affect the environment and how the plans already in
existence would also affect the environment through their contin-
ued operation. 90 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the alternatives
were adequate because they promoted informed decision-making
based on the DOI's forecasts regarding the environmental impacts
of the proposed project.91 In addition, the court held that the al-
ternatives were thorough enough to satisfy NEPA requirements.92
In Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Flowers (Greater Yellowstone Coali-
tion),93 the petitioners, an environmental advocacy group, asked
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to set aside a building permit,
alleging the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) did not adequately
explore alternatives to the project proposal.94 The developer
planned to build a golf course and residential community on a
large tract of a privately owned ranch. 95 The Corps determined
that the no action alternative actually would have had a greater det-
rimental environmental impact than the proposed action because if
the proposed action were not approved, the entire ranch would be
sold and developed into residential communities. 96 Although hav-
ing a less detrimental effect on bald eagles living on the property,
the no action plan would result in greater reductions to the wildlife
habitat than if the proposed plan or one of its alternatives were
87. See id. at 860 (describing allegations against DOI).
88. See id. at 868 (establishing requirement that alternatives section must facil-
itate reader to make informed decision).
1 89. See id. (discussing EIS's consideration of wildlife and environmental
effects).
90. See Westlands, 376 F.3d at 869 (discussing how no action would affect
environment).
91. See id. at 872 (noting factors making no action alternative valid).
92. See id. (holding EIS's no action alternative sufficient where it allowed for
informed decision making).
93. 359 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 2004).
94. See id. at 1262-63 (noting petitioner's arguments).
95. See id. at 1264 (discussing plan to develop land, which necessitated EIS).
96. See id. at 1266 (considering consequence of no action alternative).
10
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allowed to proceed. 97 The no action plan considered the impact
on animals and the surrounding environment, and it compared no
action with the other alternative proposals. 98 The Tenth Circuit
held the no action plan was adequately detailed and the level of
effort and documentation involved in its creation were consistent
with the proposal's expected environmental impact.99
In Communities Against Runway Expansion, Inc. v. FAA (Commu-
nities Against Runway Expansion),100 various advocacy groups op-
posed an airport expansion and petitioned for review of a Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) order approving the construction of
a new runway and improvement of an existing taxiway. 1° 1 The Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit Court described the steps the agency took
in its evaluation of all alternative plans, including the no action al-
ternative. 10 2 The final EIS considered several studies of the run-
way's effect on the environment and the commercial aspects of the
airport's business. 10 3 Factors specifically considered included:
ground traffic; expected delays with and without the runway; noise
pollution increases if the plan were accepted; and the effect of
noise pollution burdens on residents adjacent to the airport based
on their socioeconomic status. 10 4 Thus, the discussion of alterna-
tives took into account the no action alternative compared with va-
rious other plans and how, in each scenario, the proposal would
affect both environmental and economic concerns. 10 5
In Lee v. United States Air Force (Lee),106 ranchers and livestock-
raising associations sought review of a United States Air Force deci-
sion to allow additional German Air Force aircrafts access to the
97. See id. at 1266-68 (discussing detrimental effects of no action alternative
compared with proposed action and other proposed alternative plans).
98. See Greater Yellowstone Coalition, 359 F.3d at 1267 (listing criteria considered
in no action plan section of Corps' EIS).
99. See id. at 1270 (holding no action alternative section sufficient because it
considered impact on wildlife and ecosystem, and it expounded sufficiently to fa-
cilitate reader to compare with other proposed actions).
100. 355 F.3d 678 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
101. See id. at 681-83 (discussing environmental impact of runway expansion).
102. See id. at 682-83 (listing steps FAA took to comply with no action alterna-
tive requirement). The petitioners failed to allege properly substantive flaws in the
FAA's final EIS, and thus were not entitled to relief. See id. at 681.
103. See id. at 682-83 (describing final EIS).
104. See id. (discussing factors such as pollution, economic effects and foresee-
able repercussions if no action taken).
105. See Cmtys. Against Runway Expansion, 355 F.3d at 682-83 (holding no ac-
tion alternative sufficient because it considered environmental and economic ef-
fects to facilitate comparison between no action and proposed action).
106. 354 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2004).
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local Air Force base. 10 7 The District Court for the District of New
Mexico upheld the Air Force's decision.' 08 The plaintiffs appealed
to the Tenth Circuit, arguing, among other things, that the EIS was
defective for failing to expound adequately the possible project
alternatives. 109
The court held that the Air Force had complied with NEPA
requirements regarding adequate alternatives, including a no ac-
tion alternative, in the proposal's EIS.110 The court noted that
NEPA and the CEQ do not require an agency to analyze environ-
mental consequences of alternatives that the agency has rejected as
too remote, speculative, impractical or ineffective as long as it is
done in good faith. 11 The court added, however, that NEPA and
the CEQ require that all agencies explore rigorously and evaluate
objectively all reasonable alternatives. 112
Moreover, Air Force regulations specify "'[rleasonable' alter-
natives are those that meet the underlying purpose and need for
the proposed action and that would cause a reasonable person to
inquire further before choosing a particular course of action.""13
Although United States Air Force regulations are not binding on
civilian courts, the language is indicative of NEPA and CEQ stan-
dards. 114 Further, the Tenth Circuit noted that NEPA requires an
EIS to include a proposed action's expected impact on categories
such as "ecological, aesthetic, historical, cultural, economic, social,
and health . . . whether direct, indirect, or cumulative."' 1 5 The
court found the Air Force's EIS adequately discussed the proposal's
expected impact on economics, noise pollution and local
livestock.1 16
107. See id. at 1233 (seeking injunction to prevent additional air plane access
to air base, claiming noise and traffic would disrupt environment).
108. See id. at 1233-34 (affirming Air Force's decision).
109. See id. at 1234 (describing plaintiffs argument).
110. See id. (holding defendant complied with no action alternative
requirement).
111. See Lee, 354 F.3d at 1238 (explaining level of analysis required for
alternatives).
112. See id. (requiring agencies to develop all reasonable alternative actions,
including no action at all).
113. See id. (quoting 32 C.F.R. pt. 989.8(b) (2005)) (describing requirements
for alternative to be considered reasonable alternative).
114. See supra note 69 and accompanying text for a discussion of EIS
purposes.
115. See Lee, 354 F.3d at 1240 (citing 40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.8 (2004)) (noting
which categories must be considered when rendering EIS).
116. See Lee, 354 F.3d at 1240-46 (holding defendant sufficiently complied
with alternative action requirement by considering economic and environmental
impacts).
12




In Hammond, the District Court for the District of Columbia
held that the BLM's final EIS adequately addressed the no action
alternative.117 In counts three and four of Hammond's complaint,
Hammond argued that the "reasonable alternatives" an agency
must consider in preparing an EIS must include the possibility of
taking no action and that the BLM did not adequately discuss the
no action alternative. 1 8 Hammond further argued, somewhat cir-
cularly, that the BLM should have adopted the no action alternative
because it was the only reasonable choice in light of Hammond's
argument that the Williams pipeline project should not proceed."19
The District Court began its analysis by noting that the stan-
dard of review regarding an agency finding is the arbitrary and ca-
pricious standard, pursuant to the APA.120 The district court then
stated that a reviewing court may deem agency actions arbitrary or
capricious if an agency has "entirely failed to consider an important
aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that
runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible
that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product
of agency expertise."'121 Despite strong language indicating defer-
ence to the agency decision, a reviewing court must undertake a
thorough and in-depth review of the agency action to determine if
the agency based the action on relevant factors or made a clear
error in judgment. 122 If the agency has "considered the relevant
factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made," then a reviewing court will uphold the
agency's decision.' 23
117. See Hammond v. Norton, 370 F. Supp. 2d 226, 241 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding
BLM met NEPA requirements for no action alternative).
118. See id. (discussing Hammond's allegation that BLM insufficiently ex-
plained no action alternative).
119. See id. (discussing Hammond's claim that project was not economically
or environmentally sound and no action alternative was only solution).
120. See id. at 238-39 (discussing relevant standard of review). Under the
APA, "a reviewing court may only set aside agency actions, findings, or conclusions
when they are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law." See id. at 238 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2000)).
121. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assoc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 42-43 (1983) (illustrating meaning of arbitrary and capricious standard of
review).
122. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16
(1971) (discussing court's responsibility in reviewing agency action).
123. See Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87,
105 (1983) (noting criteria required for upholding agency decision).
2006]
13
McTigue: Hammond v. Norton: Taking Action to Preserve the No Action Altern
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006
472 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. XVII: p. 459
The district court stated that the BLM's discussion of the no
action alternative for the Williams pipeline "proceed[ed] by reca-
pitulating the possible negative effects of pipeline construction, and
by extension, the environmental effects that would not [have] oc-
cur[red] absent pipeline construction. '" 124 The court concluded
that the need for petroleum products required approval of the Wil-
liams project.125 The court noted the Williams project was neces-
sary to ensure projected petroleum product deficits did not
increase annually, as was projected without the Williams pipe-
line. 126 The court held that the EIS sufficiently discussed, although
briefly, the costs and benefits of no action with enough specificity to
allow meaningful comparison with other alternatives. 127
The district court also held that the DOI did not act arbitrarily
or capriciously in approving the project based on the final EIS. 128
The court noted that a court should not substitute its own judg-
ment based on policy considerations when the agency's ruling is
fully informed.' 29 Accordingly, the court held the BLM sufficiently
expounded the no action alternative and the DOI properly ap-
proved it, pursuant to the requisite standard of review.1 30
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Hammond court erroneously found the BLM satisfied its
duty to provide a fully shaped no action alternative. 31 During its
discussion of the no action alternative, the district court directly
stated that the BLM's final EIS only recapitulated the possible nega-
tive effects of going forward with the Williams pipeline project be-
tween Salt Lake City and Bloomfield. 132 There is no evidence in
the record that the final EIS discussed what the consequences of no
action would be on the environment with any level of detail, outside
its obvious assertion that the project's anticipated impact would not
124. See Hammond v. Norton, 370 F. Supp. 2d 226, 241 (D.D.C. 2005) (discuss-
ing court's reasoning for finding no action alternative sufficient).
125. See id. at 241-42 (noting court's purpose for approving project).
126. See id. (discussing economic repercussions of not proceeding with pipe-
line project).
127. See id. at 242 (holding alternative action section of EIS provided enough
detail to facilitate meaningful reader comparison among proposed actions).
128. See id. (finding DOI did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in relying on
final EIS).
129. See Hammond, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 239-40 (holding courts should pay great
deference to agency decision when agency is fully informed).
130. See id. at 241-42 (discussing court's findings).
131. See id. at 239-40 (stating district court's holding).
132. See id. at 241 (analyzing BLM's no action alternative).
14
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occur. 33 The final EIS, however, did discuss the economic conse-
quences of proceeding with the no action alternative, which in-
cluded a projected diesel gasoline deficit by the year 2013 and
deficits in other petroleum products starting in 2001, leading to sig-
nificant petroleum deficits by the year 2020.134
The Hammond EIS is sufficiently similar to the Westlands EIS to
render the Hammond holding erroneous.13 5 The EIS in Westlands
provided a complete discussion of the no action alternative when it
discussed the effects on local wildlife and the environment, includ-
ing the fish population and the water quality.136 Unlike the Ham-
mond EIS, the Westlands EIS discussed how a lack of action would
affect the environment and how existing plans would continually
affect the environment if the proposal was not instituted.1 37 There-
fore, the Westlands court properly held the FWS and National
Marine Fisheries Service's treatment of alternatives to the proposal,
including the no action alternative, was sufficient because the dis-
cussions promoted informed decision-making and thoroughly illus-
trated the ramifications of not allowing the proposal or any other
action to proceed.1 3 8 Unlike the no action alternative in Hammond,
the Westlands discussion included probable outcomes if no action
were taken, which facilitated an intelligent comparison between
taking no action and approving the project proposal. 139 This dis-
tinction is critical in finding the Hammond analysis of the BLM's no
action alternative section cursory and incomplete. 140
The Hammond EIS is also distinguishable from the fully devel-
oped EIS prepared in Greater Yellowstone Coalition.141 Specifically,
the Corps in that case considered how no action would lead to dif-
ferent use of the land and have greater detrimental environmental
133. See id. (illustrating court's inattention to no action alternative's failure to
discuss environmental effects).
134. See id. at 241-42 (discussing economic effects of no action alternative in
final EIS).
135. For a description of the EIS in Westlands, see supra notes 89-90 and ac-
companying text.
136. See Westlands Water Dist. v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 376 F.3d 853,
868 (9th Cir. 2004) (illustrating comprehensive impacts on environment).
137. See id. at 869 (discussing components of no action alternative in
Westlands).
138. See id. at 872 (discussing elements that led court to hold no action alter-
native sufficient).
139. See id. at 868-69 (noting why no action alternative was appropriate).
140. For a discussion of the shortcomings of the Hammond court's analysis of
the no action alternative, see infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
141. See Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 359 F.3d 1257, 1267 (10th Cir.
2004) (discussing elements of no action alternative section found within case).
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impacts. 142 Instead of creating a golf course and using the land
only partially for residential purposes, the developers could take no
action and sell the entire lot for residential use.1 43 Not only did the
Corps consider the effect on the actual land, but it also considered
the effect on indigenous animal populations. 144 The Tenth Circuit
held the no action plan was adequately detailed, the level of detail
in the discussion was proportionate to the proposal's expected envi-
ronmental impact and the no action alternative adequately took
into account the ramifications of taking no action. 145 In contrast,
the district court in Hammond found the BLM's final EIS provided
an adequate no action alternative even though it did not examine
the impact on local wildlife and other non-economic consequences
on the land if the proposal were not approved. 146
Finally, unlike the Hammond EIS, the Communities Against Run-
way Expansion EIS adequately considered the project proposal's eco-
nomic and environmental effects. 147 In the final EIS's no action
alternative section, the agency contemplated how the effects of not
building an additional runway at the airport would contribute to
higher traffic rates at other runway sites and increase noise pollu-
tion for those areas. 148 The court contrasted the result of barring
the proposal with the traffic and noise pollution projections if the
FAA were to implement the proposal. 149 The final EIS complied
with NEPA and CEQ regulations by providing enough information
in the no action alternative for an informed basis of comparison
with the original proposal and the alternative plans. 150 This is
markedly different from the district court's approach in Hammond,
where the court was satisfied with the no action alternative discus-
sion because it made the obvious point that if the proposal were not
approved, the projected environmental impact of the proposal
142. See id. at 1266 (discussing possible effect of no action).
143. See id. (discussing environmental impacts in wake of no action compared
to proposed action).
144. See id. (considering impacts on land and wildlife).
145. See id. at 1273 (holding alternative action section requirement fulfilled).
146. See Hammond v. Norton, 370 F. Supp. 2d 226, 241-42 (D.D.C. 2005) (dis-
cussing elements found within BLM's no action alternative section).
147. See Cmtys. Against Runway Expansion, Inc. v. FAA, 355 F.3d 678, 682-83
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting elements found within no action alternative).
148. See id. (discussing logistical problems arising from not building addi-
tional runway as well as noise pollution effects).
149. See id. (comparing effects of proposed action with effects of no action).
150. See id. (holding no action alternative sufficient because it provided
enough information for informed basis of comparison).
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would not occur.1 5 1 The BLM's final EIS in Hammond did not take
into account, as the FAA did in Communities Against Runway Expan-
sion, how barring the proposal would cause other consequences,
aside from the obvious lack of direct consequences associated with
the action. 1
52
The critical difference between the above cases and Hammond
is that the Hammond court only required a finding of the economic
impact within the no action alternative and not the environmental
impact.153 The Hammond court did not properly analyze the no ac-
tion alternative because it did not require the BLM to discuss the
environmental impact if no action was taken, aside from the obvi-
ous effect of the proposed action not occurring.15 4 The district
court should have required the BLM to discuss the environmental
repercussions beyond the simplistic statement that the proposed ac-
tion would not occur. 15 5 As in Greater Yellowstone Coalition, where no
action would have led to greater land development, the no action
alternative in Hammond should have considered the effects that
would arise collaterally if the Williams project were not
approved. 156
VI. IMPACT
By dismissing Hammond's claim that the BLM's no action al-
ternative was not sufficiently developed, the Hammond court broke
from case precedent and relaxed the requirements for discussion of
no action alternatives within an EIS.1 5 7 The decisions and reason-
ing in the above-cited cases, along with CEQ and "NEPA require-
ments, require no action alternatives to be sufficiently exposited to
allow meaningful comparison between the proposal, the alterna-
151. See Hammond v. Norton, 370 F. Supp. 2d 226, 241-42 (D.D.C. 2005) (dis-
cussing Hammond court's approach to analyzing no action alternative).
152. See id. (noting inadequacy of BLM's no action alternative in Hammond).
153. See id. (discussing BLM's no action alternative and economic conse-
quences of no action).
154. See id. (discussing why illustration of negative effects of project necessa-
rily shows what no action alternative would prevent).
155. See Cmtys. Against Runway Expansion, 355 F.3d 678 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(describing environmental and economic impact of no action); see also Lee v. United
States Air Force, 354 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2004) (discussing economic, political and
environmental impact of no action); see also Westlands Water Dist. v. United States
Dep't of the Interior, 376 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding no action alternative suffi-
cient where it allowed informed decision-making).
156. See generally Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 359 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir.
2004) (discussing environmental impact of future projects on land because of de-
nial of current project).
157. For a discussion of the Hammond court's failure to follow precedent, see
supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
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tives and the no action alternative.158 Although the Hammond court
decided the case on different grounds, the court's treatment of the
no action alternative requirement will provide a basis for future
courts to evaluate no action alternatives. 159
The Hammond court weakened environmental policy by al-
lowing a relaxed interpretation of the requirements for the no ac-
tion alternative. 160 If no action alternative standards are not strictly
enforced, agencies issuing an EIS may not fully consider whether a
proposed action is detrimental to the environment.1 61 Addition-
ally, if no action alternatives are not adequately expounded, agen-
cies may not fully consider whether taking no action would actually
adversely affect the environment more than accepting a project
proposal. 162
The no action alternative requirement is equally as important
as every other facet of an EIS because it provides a basis for the
relevant agency and reviewing courts to determine if a proposed
action is beneficial now and in the future. 163 The Hammond court
effectively lowered the level of analysis required for examining no
action alternatives, and if this becomes a trend, EISs will fail to serve
their purpose of providing the reader with a comprehensive basis
for comparing the effects of a proposed project with all reasonable
alternatives. ' 64
James McTigue
158. See Hammond, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 242 (discussing purpose of no action
alternative).
159. For a discussion of the other counts alleged in Hammond and their reso-
lutions, see supra note 20.
160. For a discussion of the effects of lowering standards of no action alterna-
tives, see supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
161. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 1502.14 (discussing purpose of no action alternative and
other alternatives).
162. See id. (noting EIS requirements).
163. See Hammond, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 242 (discussing value of no action alter-
native for comparing proposals).
164. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 1502.1 (detailing purpose of EIS).
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